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I. Introduction
The policyissuesinforestryanduplandresource managementwillbe
viewedinthispaperintermsofthe inter-related problemsof (a) excessive
loggingand forest destructionand (b) the continuingconversionof for-







Inwhatway isforestlandConversion excessive?Althoughthere are
varyingestimates,itisstillclearthatthe rateofforestdestruction, measured
in hectares,hasbeen substantial inthepastdecadeor so.Onthe lowend,
the BureauofForestryDevelopment orBFD(thisagencyhasbeenreorgan-
izedasthe ForestManagementBureauofthe newDepartmentof Environ-
mentand NaturalResources)hasestimatedthatinthe lastdecadeanda
halfuptothe mid-1980s,about85,000 hectaresperyearof forestlandwere
convertedtootheruses(BFD, 1985).
Otherestimatesare available. Researchersfromthe Development
Academyofthe Philippines, the PhilippineInstitutefor DevelopmentStud-
ies andthe University of the Philippines Collegeof Forestryestimatethat
as muchas 200,000 hectaresperyearwerelostin the mid-1960sto mid-
1970s(PREPF, 1977). The UnitedNationsFoodandAgriculture Organiza-
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devoted to forests to be increasingly converted to agriculture, greatly
increasing land productivity. The environmental problem arises when
productive agricultural useis achievedinthe short-term atthe costof large
environmental losses. These take the form of losses in soil fertility,
additional lossesfrom sedimentation of irrigation and hydro-power reser-
voirs,aswell asincreasedfloodinginthe lowlands. Theworst-case scenario
is when forestlands are converted into open and degraded grasslands.
These produce noagricultural output while causing excessive soil erosion.
This situation in the forest and upland resource sector has beenthe
result of a long and complex process, involving the activities of various
claimantsto the benefits of using forest and upland resources. Part II t
identifies these resource users and focuses on their different perspective
and conflicting objectives in resource use. Part IIi summarizes the funda-
mental problem of resource management from society's perspective,and
Part IV presents the general directions for policy reform in the sector.
II. Resource Users and CompetingPerspectives
on Resource Use
The uplandshavevariousresourcesassociatedwiththem, including
the soiland the existingor potentialvegetativecover. The uplandsare
thereforepotentially usefulforalargenumberofeconomicactivities andfor
varioustypesofusers. Forthisreason,societyneedstorecognizeseveral
perspectives in evaluatingcompetingresourceuses. Conflicting perspec-




logging firms),the informalforestryusersor uplandfarmers(made upof




about130-- withlargelogging concessions.Theadministrative limitfor
concessionsis 100,000 hectares,but the averagesize is about 40,000.
Theseconcessionsareleasedforupto50yearsincluding renewals,andthe
logging concessionaireis required to follow what is known as the
selective logging system fortimbermanagement. Thissystemincludes
thedetermination ofan annualallowableharvestaswell asatimber-stand"CRUZ AND DELOS ANGELES: FOREST AND UPLAND RESOURCES 3
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improvementphasetoassuresustainable timbermanagement. Acutting
chargeof1_30per cubicmeteris leviedon concessionaires.It hasbeen
arguedthat this charge substantially undervaluesthe true worthof the
resourcesincethe marketpriceof timberisseveraltimesthe valueof the
cuttingcharge(DelosAngeles,1982;PowerandTumaneng,1983;Cruzet
al., 1987). In 1985,morethan6.5million hectaresofthepublic domainwere
allotedtoconcessionaires (BFD, 1985).
A smaller componentof the commercialsectoris involvedin the
grazingof cattle. Pasturepermitsandleasescovered470,000 hectaresin
1985, with 1,084 lessorsand permit-holders being allocatedabout430
hectaresof landeach. Pastureresourcesarealsoapparentlyunderpriced,
sincepermitsandleasesareissuedonthe basisof lowofficialcharges.
The irlformal sector is composed mostlyof upland farmers who
practicesomeformof agriculture onhillylands. The roleof thissectorhas
previously beengreatlyunderestimated, anddetermining itsmagnitudeand
characteristics was a majorconcernof the Upland ResourcePolicyRe-
searchProgram. (See C. J.Cruz,thisvolume). The BFDcensusofforest
occupantslistsonly279 thousandfamilies,withdependentsof 974 thou°
sand in 1985. They occupiedonly about 891 thousand hectaresof
forestlands.
As presentedinC. J.Cruz(thisvolume),however,the actual upland
population ofthePhilippines isintheorderof17million personsin1987,with
about8 millionoccupying forestlands. In additionto the large numbers
involved,the majorityof thesearemigrants fromthe lowlands. Unlikethe
tribalgroupswho often practicesustainableforms of uplandcultivation,
thesemigrantcommunities aremorepronetoexcessiveexploitationofthe
land. Thisleadstoproblemsof soilerosionandtheirdetrimentalenviron-
mentalimpact-- bothon uplandcultivation andondownstreamactivities
suchasirrigation andpowergeneration.Withrespecttoundervaluation of
thisform of resourceuse, Cruz eta/. (thisvolume)have arguedthat the
absenceofsecure tenureforthe millions ofuplandcultivators hasledtoan




of trees and land-usepractices.
Inaddition,however,therearecharacteristics peculiartoforestsand
forestlandswhichaffectanydecisionsregarding theiroptimaluse. First is
theimportanceoftimberproduction itself:standing timberisaformofcapital
resourceinthesensethatitrequiresa considerable amountoftime before
itcanbeharvested.The production oftreesforlimberdiffersdistinctlyfrom
agriculturalcropproduction. For example,the timingof the harvest--
normallypredeterminedformostagricultural crops-- isa majoroptimiza-CRUZ AND DELOSANGELES:FOREST AND UPLANDRESOURCES 5




sooneryieldsproximatebenefits,it also resultsin the liquidationof the
capitalresourcewitha substantiallapseoftime requiredbeforethe next
harvest.
Second, the forestresourcealsocontainsa considerableamountof
biomasswhich,forsometypesof userssuchasuplandcultivators, maybe
readilyconvertible intonon-timber production.Importantalternativeprod-
uctsfromthisbiomassincludefuelwoodfor householduse and ashesto
augmentsoilnutrients foragricultural production.
Third,forestsareaggregative by nature.Thisimpliesthattheirvalue
lies not onlywith the individualtree componentsbut alsoon the whole
communityof trees and their interdependent biologicalcomponents,all
growingwithinagivenecological environment.Thisimplies variousoptions
inthe managementof forestedlands. As earlierindicated,there maybe
optionsregardingthe timingandtechniqueofthetimberharvest. Exercising
one or the otheroptionwillhavecorresponding effectsonthe dependent
flora,fauna,andenvironmental systems.Inaddition, therearealsomultiple
flexibilities or optionsinforestmanagementintermsoftheabilitytoextract
multipleproductsfromforestsand trees and the possibility of producing
thoseforest-related goodsand serviceswithoutactuallycuttingtrees.
Fourth, the aggregativenatureofforestsassumesspecialrelevance
for the Philippines, whereforestsarelocatedinsteeplyslopedlands. For
•heretheyfulfilltheimportantadditional roleofminimizing soilerosionunder
tropicalrainfallconditions.
Objectives and Constraints of Various User Groups
Ifallresource usersattachsimilarrelativeimportancetothesevarious
peculiarities and rolesofforests,conflicts inthe useofforestresourcesin
the uplandswouldbe minimal. However,it ispreciselythe existenceof




Column2 highlights theconstraints perceived by the different upland
resource users. Thelimiting factorin the uplandresource sector ofproduc-
tion, for a country such as the Philippines,is the amount of land that is
availab/eforproduction. Amongthevarioustypesofforest/upland resource
users,the government, asthe representative of society,maybeviewedas6 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
the onewhichwillbeconcernedwithboththeoft-siteenvironmentaleffects
andthe on-sitefuture effectsof production in additionto the direct benefits
and costs associated with various forms o! uplandproduction. The public
decisionmaker therefore completely recognizes all the pecularities of
production dependent on upland resources. Thus social decisionmaking
involves assessingcompeting land uses and focuses onthe maximization
of returnsto landwith allthe threecostsor effectsmentionedaboveincluded
in the decisionmaking process,
In the case of the timber concessionaire, however, the low timber
cuttingcharges required of himinduces himto undervaluethetrue worth of
the forestas a renewableresource. He thusworries only aboutmaximizing
the returnto his investmentfor harvestingthe resource (e.g., the infrastruc-
ture that hemustconstruct andthe equipment that he mustpurchase), and
this is usually measured in terms of maximizing net present value or the
benefit-cost ratio of private capital. Thus capital, and not land, is the
concessionaire's binding constraint.
This perspectiveleadshimtoharvest moreoftheforest, thanif hewere
made to appreciate the much greater (and increasing) value of the forest.
This appreciation would be possible only if both the market and environ-
mental value of trees were charged to himand if a long enough planning
horizon were providedto allow himto benefitfrom the long-term returnsto
forest management. Therefore,given the structure ofthe current incentive
system,the concessionaire ends up(a)viewingthe on-site future effectsof
his logging activities myopically and (b) also disregarding the off-site,
environmental effectsas well. As indicatedin Column 3,the private logger
harvests considerably more treesand harvests them earlier than is appro-
priate from a social decisionmaking perspective.
Many problems also arise after the trees are cut, which are also
associatedwith the myopicand narrowperspectiveofthe individual logger.
These includeinadequatereforestationandtimber standimprovement. The
logger's disinterest in protecting his logged-over areasfrom encroachment
by lowland migrants may also be part of a strategy to avoid the costs of
replanting and managing such lands.
Forthe farmer,the absenceofsecureclaims tohisuplandplotcreates
a.decisionmaking perspectivewhich disregards the long-termvalue of _the
land. Instead, his goal isto grow and harvest as much as possible in the
short-term. As indicated in Column 2,the primary economic constraint the
upland farmer perceives is not land itself but the amount of labor his
householdcangenerate toexploitthe land. Atthe sametime, exceptforthe
fewwhopractic,,sustainableshiftingcultivation, mostforestfarmers are not
concerned, ,i" the externalities involvedin uplandfarming,suchasthe off-
site, envir¢.,_ ental effects. The results (in Column 3) are on-site land
resource deg adation and off-sitedamages through soil erosion.CRUZ AND DELOSANGELES: FOREST AND UPLAND RESOURCES 7
III. The Root of the Upland Resource Management Problem
and the Need for Basic Pricing Reform
Resource Undervaluation as the Basic Problem
Forthe varioususersof forestand uplandresources,the traditional
officialresourcepricingsystem(inthecaseof logging concessionaires and
thepasturelessors)orthe defacto landaccessorusecharges(inthecase
of uplandcultivators)underestimates the true valueofnaturalresources,
bothintermsoftheirdevelopment contribution aswellasconservation role.
This undervaluation of resourcesleads to fundamentalproblemsof re-
sourcemanagement,including the creationof excessiverents,promotion
of over-exploitation, andtheinstitutionalization of rent-seekingasthe main
modeof economic behavior.
As in any other economic activity, the private sector's use of natural
resources responds to price signals. For example, with respect to upland
resources, it the priceof access to loggingconcessions is low, then more
individuals will be interested in exploiting forests than if the price were
higher.
However,sincethere is ageneral social perceptionthat we arein fact
over-exploiting our natural resources,then clearlythe price signalsthatthe
economy is sending to private users cannot be correct, at least from the
socialpoint of view. Incommercial forestry,thesesignals may beincorrect
in terms of (a) the timber market value, as well as (b) the value of the
environmental protection servicesthat forests provide. We have already
pointed out above that the administrative price of1_30per cubic meter of
wood grosslyunderestimatesthe marketpriceoftimber. With respecttothe
undervaluation oftheenvironmental protectionservicesofforest resources,
economists have long recognized that even if prices reflected the true
market worth of timber, price signals would still be misleading if an
individual's economic activity generates physical effects which impose
costsor losses on others for which the individual is not held economically
accountable. Thus, for example, cutting trees may be fine for individual
concessionaires becausethey are not chargedfor the effects of excessive
soil erosion on hydro-electricplants and irrigation reservoirs.
The recognition that the exploitation of upland natural resourcesys-
tems generates substantial non-priceeffectsonother individuals in society
isthe basicjustificationfor governmentintervention in theiruse. The roleof
government inmanaging resourcesonbehalfofsocietyshouldbetodefend
a social price for the exploitation of resources. Our expectation therefore
would be that the prices administered by the government for access to
upland resource exploitation wouldbe substantiallyhigher than the market
prices that wouldotherwise prevail for accessto the same resources.8 JOURNAl:OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
However,anycasualsurvey ofthecharges, fees, and licensesas the
administrative prices for resource exploitation will show that, contrary to
expectation, these are much too low to properly reflect social valuations.
Indeed,insomeinstancesthey areeven muchlowerthanwhatwouldprevail
if the rightsto useresourceswere simplyput onthe auctiontable andprices
were determined by the market. The cutting charge for timber is close to
becoming a classic example of this undervaluation: we charge'P30 per
cubic meter of wood for cutting down our forests vs. a market price
(dependingonthe type of wood)beyond_"1,000or'P3,000 per cubic meter.
Infairness to our present resource administrators, it must be pointed
out that many of these prices are really inherited ones, and probably,
resourcesin the pastwere so abundantandthe demandsof amuchsmaller
populationwere so limitedthat suchi(_wfees were reasonable. Howeverin
the current context of our problems of resource over-exploitation and
degradation, thecontinueduseofsuchprices shouldberecognizedforwhat
they now represent: not social preferences but anti-social negligence.
The Results of Undervaluation: Over-Exploitation,
Excessive Rents, and Inequity
The economic activities associated with the exploitation of natural
resources are characterized by an over-dependence on formal or discre-
tionary pricing of key resources (such as standing timber) or licensing of
accessto other (as in the caseof coastal fishery resources). Because the
pricesassignedto suchresourcesdonot evenstartto approximatetheirtrue
market values (much less their true social values, which may include
beneficialenvironmental effects),the tendency isto create excessdemand
for the exploitation of these resources.
in commercial forestry the rents earnedby firms that gain the rightto
exploit these resources areunusually large. It iswell known that the effect
ofsuchunearned surpluses isto motivate widespread rent-seekingbehav-
ior sincethese rents, by definition, represent returns abovethose actually
required to attract or keep firms in an industry. Over time, the persistence
of such rents leads to overexploitationof the resource as private interests
scramble to partake of the windfall.
Indeed,thewidely recognizedproblemof inequityinthe socialsharing
ofthe benefitsfrom the use of natural resources isalso utimatelyrelatedto
this institutionalization of excessive rents. The reasonisthat the existence
of discretionary resource administration, plus the competition to squeeze
through bureaucratic red-tape and fulfill difficult requirements to capture
those elusive licenses, concessions, and claims almost ensure that small-
time operators or community interests are squeezed out by the big and
influential concerns.CRUZ AND DELOSANGELES: FOREST AND UPLAND RESOURCES 9
In addition to the unrealisticdiscretionary pricing in the case of
commercialforestry, for uplandfarming, proper valuationis constrained by
the property rights context within which the small upland farmer makes
decisions. In the first place, rational economic behavior dictates that
processes andeffectsthat are notcircumscribedwithin the physical bound-
ary of one'sfarm are ignored. Thusthe conservationservices of environ_
mentally appropriate agrooforestrysystems are not incorporated in the
individual farmer's decision-making calculus. This means that off-site
environmental effects of upland agriculture (through soil erosion) are not
viewed as relevant and are therefore unpriced.
On top of this, the property rights situation is such that the farmer,
because he has no secure and permanent claim on the land that he
cultivates, has no stake in ensuringthe sustainability of land beyond what
limited cropping time frame he perceives to be reasonable. This indicates
that while hemay respondtoattemptsto promoteconservationwhose pay-
offs are fairly short-term in nature, he will normally shirk from undertaking
investmentor land improvements (such asterracing)that arepermanent in
nature.
Thequestion now iswhat should bethe direction for policy reform. It
hasbeen arguedthat the task of reformingour resource administration will
necessarilytake muchtime because ofthe manyproblems ofthe resource
sector. Because these are manyand complex,the immediatechallenge is
to locate the systematicsourceofthese problems. Otherwise, they will be
viewedasdisjointphenomenawithout anysystematicsolutionwhen, infact,
the response requires-- more basicthan anything else -- achange in the
structure of incentivesfor exploitingforest and upland resources.
IV. Directions for Policy Reform
TheNeed for Changesin the Incentive Structure
The necessarychanges in managementapproachfollow logically
fromthisanalysis.Ingeneral, whenwetalkof howto manage resources,
therearereallyonlytwobasictoolsavailabletoeffectchangesin resource
use: rules andprices. Rulesrefertoformalorinformalregulationaimedat
structuring the behaviorof individuals, withcomplianceachievedthrough
the useofsanctions or enforcement.Managementbyprices,onthe other
hand, refersto the useof bothmarketpricesor non-marketvaluationsto
changethe incentive systemonwhichindividual decisionmaking isbased.
Bothapproacheshavetheobjectiveof re-directingindividualactions
towardsociallybeneficialresults.Whilerule-making has,ofcourse,always
been the concernof government,naturalresourcemanagementthrough
price interventionhashada muchshorterhistoryinpublicadministration.10 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Indeed,the traditionofpublicadministration of Philippine forestandupland
resourceshasgenerallybeen rule-oriented,andourcurrentdiscussionof
the uplandresourcemanagementproblemshowsthe needforintegrating
pricing policyor restructuringof systemswith the traditional rule-oriented
approach. Withthe great expanseofthe public uplandsto bemanaged and
the many dispersed users of upland resources, integrating the proper
incentives for harnessing local management potential may be the only
practical approach to resource management.
Two BasicRecommendations
Inthis lastsection,we highlighttwo recommendationsthat havedirect
relevance to the need for reform of the incentive structure previously
analyzed. There are other recommendations, especially on requirements
for technical or demographic,assessment and on implementation aspects,
that are discussed in the other papers in this volume. These make up a
separate set and are therefore not directly included here.
1. Price Reformfor the Environmental Services
and Commercial Value of Forest Resources
The potential contribution of valuation methodologiesfor the environ-
mental effects of soil erosion to benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is apparent.
Valuation methodologies, as developed in the program, have the purpose
ofdeterminingpropershadowpricesfor projectoutputsthat have significant
environmental effects.
Beyond and more important than this shadow-pricing objective,
however, isthe more basic goal of generally improving resource-pricing in
the formulation of resource policy. The impact of government projects
(which are the objects of BCA valuation), though individually large and
expensive, are restrictedto specific sites sothat their contribution canonly
be limited compared with the effect of general policies. Examples of the
latter are policies that govern input pricing, suchas timber cutting charges
and incentives for soil conservation to upland farmers. This means that,
while government should not abandon the use of projects in its upland
management program, it must recognize that the most substantial and
immediate impactthat may be madeon resource exploitation and conser-
vationwill bethrough proper inputandoutput pricing,resourcetaxation, and
conservationsubsidies -- all of which require proper resource valuation.
With respecttogeneral conservationsubsidies,the research program
hasshown that it will beusefulto establish asubsidy for erosion abatement
programswhich could beworth about'P29 per ton of erosion abatement in
cultivated landsinwatersheds similartoPantabangan. A relatedimplicationCRUZ AND DELOSANGELES:FOREST AND UPLAND RESOURCES 11
is that it may not be fruitfulto even attemptto establishsoil erosion
abatementstandardsin termsof physicalquantitiesof allowableerosion.
Whatmaybe moreeffectiveisforgovernment toestablisha basicconser-
vationsubsidy,anditwouldsubsequently be the challengeto uplandsoil








reservoirs.The chargethatshouldbe placedonthecuttingof timbermust
therefore reflect both the market value of the wood and the cost of
compensating societyforincreasedsoilerosionlosses.
Thepropersocialpricing ofnaturalforests willalsoputthepotential for
an aggressivetree plantationprogramin properperspective. Inthe Past,
these programscould notbe generallycompetitivesimplybecause the
economicsof the timbersectordid not recognizethe value of the forest
resourceitself. Propertimberstandvaluation willallowthe industry toview
plantationestablishment and managementinitsproperperspective -- as
investmentinan increasingly valuableasset.
2. Property Rights Change for Upland Conservation
and Its Potential Impacton the Land Reform Program
Beyondthe contribution ofthe uplandstowardproviding commercial-
timberresourcesistheirroleinproviding livelihoods toa= largeproportion of
ruralcommunities, manyofwhicharelocatedinforestlands anddependent
onsomeformof uplandresourceexploitation.On the one hand,there is
heavypopulation pressurecompelling farmerstoekeouta living evenfrom
marginallands;onthe otherhand,government capabilityisinadequateto
excludemigrants topubliclands.The incentive isclearthereforeforupland
farmerstoexploitthe landwithoutregardtothe needforsoilconservation.
Soilconservation practices are,afterallnotcostless.Atthesametime,





its long*termproductivity,the potentialgain from reducingsoil erosion
cannotbecapturedbythe farmers.themselves.
Itisthereforenotsurprising thatuplandfarmersexploitthe landuntil12 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
its productivitydeclinesthenmoveonto a newplot. This practicewillnot
substantially changeunlessthe basicincentivestructure isreformed:the
necessaryconditionforthe adoptionof conservationpracticesin upland
farmingisthe allocation of secure c/aimsover the lan_d.
Thishasbeenthe basisforthegovernment'ssocialforestryprogram
thatwas initiatedearlyin thisdecade. The program'sgoal isto provide
uplandfarmerswithsecuretenureonthe landsthattheycultivatethrough
the awardingof certificatesof stewardship. The stewardshipcontract
essentially allowsfarmersa25-year(renewableand=inheritable") termover
a plotof land. The programiscertainlya stepinthe rightdirection, and in
the future, full ownershipshouldbegrantedoncesustainableuseofthe
landisdemonstrated.However,the currentcoverageofthe programdoes
not even reachfivepercentof moderatelyslopedlandsthatcanprobably
be subjectto someformof cultivation.
The coverageand conductof the programthereforeneeds serious
evaluation.The trendsinpopulation growthandmigration indicatethatthe
problemof population pressureneedstobe addressed directly.Proposals
that do not recognizethisfactor have no chanceof succeeding,so that
detailedstudiesshouldnowbe initiated thatwillassessthe prospects fora
broadprogramofcontrolling migration through propertyrights changeinthe
uplands. Indeed,thiseffortshouldnotbeviewedmerelyasa conservation
program; instead, it should properly be promoted as part of the
government's land reform thrust. The importanceof this cannot be over-
emphasized; government actually has available to it a potentially powerful
resource-conservationtoot--the grantingofsecurerightstouplandfarmers
--which atthe sametime can makeone ofthe biggestcontributions to the
government's land reform program.CRUZ AND DELOS ANGELES: FORES; AND UPLAND RESOURCES 13
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